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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## "SUMMIT" SUPPLEMENT



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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State Department review completed

JCS review(s) completed

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

23 June 1955

The following is a summary of information received during the week on Soviet bloc preparations for the four-power conference.

General Soviet objectives and attitudes

Soviet propaganda: During the period 13-19 June, Soviet propaganda comment followed up the 13 June Soviet note and accompanying TASS statement. It emphasized the necessity for a detente in international relations and contrasted Soviet moves to relax tension with US obstructionism, evident in continued proposals to discuss the Satellites and indications of intent to seek special concessions from the USSR. The TASS statement's list of "really urgent" outstanding problems is widely repeated. European collective security rather than Germany is cited repeatedly as a conference topic.

A broadcast in French on 20 June gave the first commentary built around the San Francisco meeting. It claimed that as a founder of the UN the USSR has remained faithful to the principle of great-power unanimity, but that certain American circles are bent on transforming the organization into an arena for the cold war and have managed to postpone General Assembly action on the Soviet disarmament proposal, the banning of atomic weapons, and the outlawing of war propaganda.

The London Soviet-Japanese talks were cited increasingly in enumerations of Soviet moves to relax international tension.

Use of the Warsaw treaty: The American embassy in Warsaw comments that although the Warsaw eight-power treaty has been ratified by all the signatories, there has been no news in Poland of any steps toward practical implementation. This would seem to indicate that none are necessary and that therefore the treaty was a mere legalistic confirmation for possible negotiating purposes.

Disarmament

Soviet propaganda: During the period 13-19 June, US listeners heard Moscow's first extensive discussion in recent weeks of American support for the WPC signature drive. Only one commentary discussed the Soviet disarmament proposal at length. It followed an unusually detailed explanation of the proposed control apparatus with the warning--included in the Home Service version but omitted in a summary for the American audience--that aggressors can now easily stockpile nuclear weapons in secret "for sudden attack and the unleashing of atomic warfare with all its very grave consequences for the people."

Molotov on UN disarmament subcommittee: Molotov said he did not see how the UN disarmament subcommittee could interfere with the work of the heads of government, when French foreign minister Pinay proposed at the four-power foreign ministers meeting in San Francisco on 20 June that the subcommittee not reconvene before August because disarmament would be discussed at the Geneva conference. Molotov said that he thought the heads of government would set up subsequent tasks for the foreign ministers and might do the

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same for the subcommittee. When Pinay repeated that there appeared to be little point in a subcommittee meeting before the Geneva meeting, Molotov countered that he was uninformed on the last period of the subcommittee's work and wished to receive this information in order to orient himself. He also said there was no doubt but that the heads of government would give serious attention to disarmament.

Peaceful uses of atomic energy: Moscow radio announced that the Soviet Academy of Sciences will hold a session from 1 to 5 July devoted to scientific and technological problems connected with the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Germany

Soviet propaganda: During the period 13-19 June, Soviet commentators continued to note the prospects for reunification inherent in the normalization of Moscow-Bonn relations and to suggest that German initiative could be effective. A 29 May commentator's statement to the Germans that "it is wrong to consider Germany's reunification dependent exclusively on the four powers" has been rephrased to point out that unification depends "in many respects" on four-power agreement.

Free elections: The TASS bureau chief in London asked the chief of the German news bureau in early June what German reaction would be if the Soviets offered free German elections. The TASS man said that if free elections were held, probably 90 percent of East Germany would vote for a Western government. When asked what the USSR would want in return for a free election offer, the TASS man said some form of neutralization. The German was inclined to discount the seriousness of the inquiry, although he felt that the TASS man was sounding out views under instruction.

Two-Germanys concept: The chief of the German news bureau in London sees no real evidence that Russia is planning to let go of East Germany. He was particularly impressed by a remark made by Ilichev, the press chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, when asked by a German correspondent in Moscow about the prospects of real unification. Ilichev stressed the reality of "two Germanys" and implied little willingness to consider yielding the Eastern zone.

Reunification impossible: The East German ambassador in Warsaw emphasized that German unification was impossible for a long time, and that in lieu of it, relations between the two German states were necessary.

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[REDACTED]

The East German government has prepared a military bill to be submitted to the People's Chamber in the event the situation covered in the special Warsaw agreements develops, according to a report by Information Bureau West, quoted by Agence France Press. Soviet delegates at Warsaw allegedly indicated that it would be a mistake to organize an East German national army before rearmament of West Germany was carried out. [REDACTED]

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Communist tactics in Berlin: An East German broadcast on the theme of West Berlin espionage organizations stated that the West Berlin espionage organizations stated that the West Berlin population must determine what life there is to be like and must put a stop to the spy centers. If they permit an aggravation of the "front-line city" policy, "they must not be surprised if we treat the front-line city like a front-line city." [REDACTED]

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Soviet-West German relations: Peter Florin, chief of the department for international relations of the East German Socialist Unity Party's central committee, recently announced that, like Moscow, the Satellites will offer to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn, according to Information Bureau West in Berlin. He emphasized that the USSR will not negotiate with Bonn on German reunification, considering this a purely German problem. [REDACTED]

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Officials of the Russian embassy in East Berlin have stated that the Soviets have hopes that Adenauer's trip to Moscow will enable them to compare the German and Soviet plans for a European security pact, according to the Hamburg newspaper Die Welt on 16 June. The preliminary aim of the USSR, according to Soviet embassy quarters, is limitation of armaments in East and West Germany, and it is for this reason that the German Democratic Republic has not been made a partner in the Warsaw security pact. [REDACTED]

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The West German embassy in London informed the American embassy that its commercial counselor had been approached on 15 June by the Soviet trade delegate, Beltchenko, who was obviously acting under instructions. Beltchenko expressed disappointment that Adenauer had not replied to Moscow's invitation and added that the visit would be more valuable prior to the four-power meeting than afterwards. [REDACTED]

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#### Withdrawal of troops in Europe

Soviet forces in Austria: Six 100mm antiaircraft guns observed in possession of a Soviet unit in Austria are the first 100mm AA guns seen in Austria, according to G-2, USFA, which comments that their presence materially increases Soviet AAA defense capabilities there. During the week ending 15 June, no significant changes were noted in the disposition of Soviet ground forces in Austria. [REDACTED]

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the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Austria is to commence in early July. Maximum daily traffic planned at this time is 12 trains with 60 cars each. The trains will take three days to shuttle between Austria and Chop, a Soviet rail transshipment center on the Soviet-Hungarian border. The total time for complete withdrawal and regrouping will be one month.

G-2 USFA comments that the estimated total number of rail cars is considered inadequate to move all CGF forces from Austria, but that the rest of the troops might move out via motor transportation. Although a move via Chop would indicate withdrawal into the USSR, USFA believes the troops will be stationed in Satellite countries.

Status of the Satellites

Effect of Soviet-Yugoslav talks on Poland: The American embassy in Warsaw believes that the Soviet concessions and statements made at Belgrade have no practical implications for Poland at this time. The USSR is considered unlikely to make significant concessions, if any, in Poland as a result of the demonstrated fact that certain aspects of the system in force have shown themselves unworkable. The Polish regime and the USSR probably calculate that any relaxation in controls would result in still greater discontent with remaining controls. From its few contacts, the embassy estimates that the great mass of the public is apathetic toward the change in Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and that there is great pessimism with respect to the possibilities of less Soviet control. Aside from constantly recurring rumors of Bierut's impending downfall and of the possibility that Gomulka "may" be returned to some government position, the embassy sees no indication of a change in Polish leadership.

Neutral belt

Soviets encourage Scandinavian neutralism: Norwegian foreign minister Lange, in referring to previous reports about discussions between Soviet and Norwegian diplomats on a neutral belt, said the Soviet officials had suggested that Norway and Denmark would serve their own interests far better by acquiring a neutral status such as Sweden and Finland have than by remaining within NATO. The Russians intimated vaguely that this suggestion might be related to a neutralized, united Germany. When the Norwegians wondered in reply why most of the neutralization should take place on the Western side, the Russians commented "personally" that the westernmost countries of the Soviet bloc might also acquire a neutralized status.

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Lange assumed that this meant Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and possibly Rumania. Lange told a US embassy officer that he found it hard to believe the USSR would be willing to make a firm offer of this kind. He thought this sort of talk was being used to probe the Norwegians' feelings and the real extent of Norway's desire to remain a part of the Western defense system. Referring to the series of parties given by the Soviet embassy in Oslo for all of the Storting's committees, Lange said that as the lavishly hospitable parties wore into the night, in each case they were used by the Russians primarily to impart the idea that Norway (and Denmark) would be far better off outside the "aggressive NATO Bloc." He added that the Russians made little impression. [REDACTED]

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Austria: At a private dinner attended by the four-power foreign ministers in San Francisco, Molotov raised the question of the declaration by the four powers of their intention to observe and respect the neutrality of Austria. He said a joint declaration would be the best reflection of unity, but agreed it was possible to consider the Western-preferred alternative of an identical text issued individually. Molotov felt that the declaration could be published after the Austrian treaty was in force and Austria had made its own declaration, but thought that progress could be made if it were agreed at San Francisco that the texts would be identical with the question of joint or separate issuances to be discussed later. [REDACTED]

Soviet-Yugoslav relations: Norwegian foreign minister Lange told a US embassy officer on 3 June that he was considerable mystified as to the purpose and results of the Khrushchev-Tito talks. On the surface, he felt, the final communiqué indicated that the conversations had resulted in a "draw" and the Russians had failed to get a good deal of what they had hoped for. He surmised that the long-range effect of the talks would be harmful to Russian control of the Satellites. [REDACTED]

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#### Related Far East intelligence

Formosa: Chinese Communist propaganda on Formosa continues to be low in volume and has maintained silence on the key issue of negotiations between the United States and Communist China. Unlike Soviet comment, Peiping broadcasts have thus far not intruded the Formosan issue into their sparse discussion of the impending Geneva conference.

#### Cold-war operations

Dissolution of the Cominform: Peter Florin, chief of the department of international relations of the East German Socialist Unity Party's central committee, recently announced that the Cominform is expected to be dissolved prior to the Geneva conference, according to Information Bureau West in Berlin. [REDACTED]

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